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PRECEDENTIAL
Filed January 23, 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-4054

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CLAYTON KELLUM,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 01-cr-00399)
District Judge: Hon. Clarence C. Newcomer
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 3, 2003
Before: McKEE and SMITH, Circuit Judges,
and WEIS, Senior Circuit Judge
(Filed January 23, 2004)
Elizabeth T. Hey, Esq.
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Court Division
Curtis Center, Independence Square
West
Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorney for Appellant
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Sara L. Grieb, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Clayton
imposition
under 21
sentencing
affirm.

Kellum appeals from the district court’s
of the statutory mandatory minimum sentence
U.S.C. § 841, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the
guidelines. For the reasons that follow we will

I.
On January 7, 2001, a Coatesville, Pennsylvania police
officer saw Kellum standing at the corner of North 8th
Avenue and East Chestnut Street in Coatesville. Because
the officer knew of an outstanding warrant for Kellum’s
arrest, the officer approached Kellum. When Kellum saw
the officer approaching, he fled. The officer ran after Kellum
and, during the foot pursuit, the officer saw Kellum move
his hand near a pocket in the black nylon jacket Kellum
was wearing. The officer then saw Kellum remove the jacket
and turn the corner of 910 Merchant Street. When the
officer turned the corner in pursuit he immediately saw a
Tec-9 semiautomatic 9mm machine pistol laying on the
ground. Kellum’s jacket was approximately 10 feet from the
gun, and Kellum was approximately 15 to 20 feet away,
lying near a fence and wearing no jacket.
A clear plastic container with a white lid was retrieved
from the right front pocket of the jacket. The container
contained numerous pieces of an off-white, rock-like
substance. A large, black plastic bag was recovered from
the left sleeve of the jacket. The bag contained 35 smaller
clear plastic baggies, with each baggie containing an off-
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white, rock-like substance. The substance in the container
and the bag tested positive for cocaine base, with a net
weight of 202 grams.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Kellum admitted that
the gun found on the ground was his. He said that he had
purchased the gun the previous day.
II.
A grand jury thereafter returned an indictment charging
Kellum with possession with intent to distribute in excess
of 50 grams of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One), and carrying a firearm
during, and in relation to, a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Two).
Kellum pled guilty to possession of cocaine base with
intent to distribute and carrying a firearm in relation to a
drug trafficking offense pursuant to a written plea
agreement. Under the terms of that agreement, the
government agreed to recommend that the district court
sentence Kellum to the mandatory minimum sentence or at
the low end of the sentencing guidelines, whichever was
higher. Kellum and the government further agreed that if
the statutorily required minimum sentence for the drug
offense of ten years was greater than the maximum
applicable guideline range for the drug offense, then the
appropriate sentence for the drug offense would be ten
years. Kellum and the government agreed that the
guidelines sentence for the firearm count was five years
consecutive to the sentence that would be imposed on the
drug offense.
At sentencing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the
government and Kellum recommended that the district
court sentence Kellum to the mandatory minimum sentence.1
However, the district court expressed some concern about
sentencing Kellum to a total of fifteen years imprisonment,
and questioned the government about its refusal to file a
1. At the time of his sentencing, Kellum was 23 years old. He had no
juvenile record and one adult state conviction for retail theft.
Presentence Report ¶¶ 27, 29.
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motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
The government responded by informing the court of the
opportunities it had provided Kellum to cooperate. The
government had taken several proffers from Kellum while
he was represented by prior counsel. Each time Kellum
apparently provided a little more information than the prior
time, but the government remained convinced that Kellum
was withholding information. Accordingly, the government
refused to agree to file a motion for a downward departure
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. When Kellum obtained new
counsel, the government provided Kellum with another
opportunity to proffer his cooperation. However, after
conducting that proffer, the government remained skeptical
of Kellum’s cooperation and again refused to commit to a
5K1.1 motion.
On October 21, 2002, the district court sentenced Kellum
to the statutory minimum sentences — imposing a
sentence of 120 months imprisonment on the drug
trafficking
charge
and
60
months
consecutive
imprisonment on the firearm charge. The sentence also
included a term of supervised release of five years and a
special assessment of $200. This appeal followed.
III.
Kellum correctly notes that the district court was
“obviously convinced that the 15 year sentence [it] felt
compelled to impose was” excessive. Kellum’s Br. at 12.
After hearing from the Assistant United States Attorney, the
district court said: “It strikes me . . . that 15 years is an
awfully long time for anyone to have to spend in prison for
two offenses of that nature.” The court then explained why
it was imposing a 15 year sentence even though the court
felt such a sentence to be unjust and excessive. The court
said:
I have no leeway. You may look to the court for justice,
for mercy. We don’t do that anymore. We are here just
to read what the act says, and to impose it. And it is
with great reluctance that I’m going to enter sentence
against you because, while I think your offenses were
very serious offenses, it does not serve society’s
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interest, in my view, to incarcerate you for 15 years for
those two . . . offenses under the facts as I understand
them.
App. at 80a.
However, Kellum claims that the district court did have
leeway. He contends that the district court erred by
imposing the minimum mandatory sentence because it was
unaware that it had the authority under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to impose a sentence below the statutory
minimum if it believed that the statutory minimum was
greater than necessary to achieve the four goals of
sentencing.2 In making this argument he focuses on
§ 3553(a)(2), which provides:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence. — The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider —
*******
(2)

the need for the sentence imposed —

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B)

to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
and vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In his view, this plain language
establishes an upper limit on a district court’s sentencing
authority and unambiguously prevents a district court from
2. Because Kellum did not object at his sentencing to the district court’s
sentence, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d
251, 252-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002).
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imposing a sentence that is so excessive that it exceeds the
purposes of sentencing. Put another way, Kellum argues
that by using the imperative “shall,” Congress explicitly
precluded district courts from imposing sentences that
plainly exceeded that which is necessary to fulfill the four
delineated purposes of sentencing. We disagree.
Kellum has produced no authority for this position.
Furthermore, Kellum’s argument is based upon an
extraction of only those portions of § 3553(a) that favor his
argument. However, § 3553(a) sets forth a number of other
factors that a sentencing court must consider when
sentencing. It provides:
a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.
—The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes
set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines—
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(I) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject
to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of
Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing
Commission into amendments issued under section
994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised
release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking
into account any amendments made to such guidelines
or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of
whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated
by the Sentencing Commission into amendments
issued under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject
to any amendments made to such policy statement by
act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, Section 3553(b) states that
the district court must sentence the defendant within the
sentencing guideline range unless the court finds an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance not taken into
account by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553(b). Therefore, the considerations in § 3553(a)(2) are
not the only factors that a district court must consider
when imposing a sentence.
Furthermore, the statutory sentencing provisions do not
begin with § 3553. Rather, they begin with § 3551, and
subsection (a) thereof begins the chapter concerning
sentencing as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense described in
any Federal statute, including sections 13 and 1153 of
this title, other than an Act of Congress applicable
exclusively in the District of Columbia or the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, shall be sentenced with the
provisions of this chapter so as to achieve the purposes
set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable in light of
all the circumstances of the case.
18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (emphasis added). Thus, a district court
must refer to the purposes outlined in § 3553(a)(2), “except
as otherwise specifically provided.” However, the mandatory
minimum sentences Kellum was exposed to pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)3 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)4 clearly fit
within the “except as otherwise specifically provided”
exclusion of § 3551(a).
Moreover, it is clear that Congress intended that
mandatory minimum sentences are not to be affected by
the general considerations of § 3553(a)(2) because that
statute provides the authority for the district court to
depart below the statutorily mandated minimum sentence.
Subsection (e) allows “a sentence below a level established
by statute as a minimum sentence” only upon a
3. A person convicted of carrying a gun in relation to a drug trafficking
crime “shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such . . . drug
trafficking crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 5 years.”
4. “In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving (iii)
50 grams or more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine
base . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
which may not be less that 10 years or more than life.”
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government motion for substantial assistance and
subsection (f) allows a sentence “without regard to any
statutory minimum sentence” if the “safety valve” factors
are established. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(e), (f). These two narrow
exceptions are the only authority a district court has to
depart below a mandatory minimum sentence, and neither
circumstance is present here.5 United States v. Santiago,
201 F.3d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Any deviation from the
statutory minimum sentence can only be had through the
specific procedures established through 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(e), 3553(f). . . .”); United States v. Villar, 184 F.3d
801, 803 (8th Cir. 1999). See also United States v.
Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] motion
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 unaccompanied by a motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not authorize a sentencing court
to impose a sentence lower than a statutory minimum.”).
Accordingly, it is now clear that § 3553(a) did not give the
district court the authority to sentence Kellum below the
statutorily mandated minimum sentence here. Therefore,
we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.6

5. The district court clearly understood this. Indeed, we do not doubt
that it was the district court’s understanding of the extreme limits on
sentencing discretion that caused the court to observe that it must
mechanically impose a sentence whether or not it considered the
sentence to be just.
6. Although we must affirm the judgment of sentence, we agree with the
concerns the sentencing court expressed in imposing a sentence that it
believed to be so extreme and harsh as to be unjust.
Such expressions are not new, and the sentencing court here was not
alone in expressing these concerns. Such concerns have been expressed
by scholars and courts alike for well over a decade. See, Michael Tonry,
Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
Mandatory Guidelines, 4 Fed. Sent. R. 129 (1991).
The respected sentencing judge here had decades of experience
overseeing criminal prosecutions and imposing sentences. That very
valuable experience and the wisdom and context it might have otherwise
afforded the choice of an appropriate punishment was negated by the
spreadsheet calculus that has now displaced thoughtful and
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A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

individualized sentencing. The court was therefore forced to mechanically
apply a retributive sentencing scheme that has been widely criticized and
which is driven by considerations of incapacitation rather than a policy
of focused, and individualized sentencing.
We can only hope that the concerns expressed by such experienced
jurists are heeded by the Sentencing Commission and Congress as they
reassess the policies underlying the current sentencing guidelines.

